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Abstract
It is widely believed that individualistic societies, which emphasize personal freedom, award social
status for accomplishment, and favor minimal government intervention, are more prone to higher
levels of income inequality compared to more collectivist societies, which value conformity, loyalty,
and tradition and favor more interventionist policies. The results in this paper, however, challenge
this conventional view. Drawing on a rich literature in biology and evolutionary psychology, we test
the provocative Parasite Stress Theory of Values, which suggests a possible link between the historical
prevalence of infectious diseases, the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism and differences
in income inequality across countries. Specifically, in a two-stage least squares analysis, we use the
historical prevalence of infectious diseases as an instrument for individualistic values, which, in the
next stage, predict the level of income inequality, measured by the net GINI coefficient from the
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). Our findings suggest that societies with
more individualistic values have significantly lower net income inequality. The results are robust even
after controlling for a number of confounding factors such as economic development, legal origins,
religion, human capital, other cultural values, economic institutions, and geographical controls.
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1 Introduction
A rich literature in social psychology, and more recently economics, has identified the
value dimension individualism-collectivism (IC) as one of the most important cultural de-
terminants of economic growth and prosperity (Oyserman et al., 2002; Gorodnichenko and
Roland, 2012). Broadly defined, the IC dimension is the degree to which people are em-
bedded within groups in society. In individualistic societies the ties between individuals are
loose and everyone is expected to look after themselves and their immediate family (Hofst-
ede et al., 1991). Such societies place value on personal freedom, self-reliance, creative ex-
pression, intellectual and affective autonomy, minimal government intervention, and reward
individual accomplishments with higher social status. Higher rewards generate productivity
that makes societies richer by channeling entrepreneurial talent into experimentation and
innovation (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2012), but the newly created wealth is inevitably
distributed unevenly as entrepreneurs enter new markets and generate extraordinary wealth
for themselves.1
Collectivist societies, on the other hand, are the ones where individuals are born into
strong, cohesive in-groups and receive protection from their extended family in return for
unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede et al., 1991). Collectivism encourages conformity and dis-
courages individuals from standing out from the group through variety of restrictive social
norms that undermine individual achievement in favor of group solidarity, the status quo,
and traditional order (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2012). Indeed, as Pitlik and Rode (2016,
p.10) show, people in more collectivist societies are far more likely to support intervention-
ist attitudes such as the belief that “government should take responsibility to ensure that
everyone is provided for.” Such cultural attitudes play an important role in influencing
redistributive policy, which can influence the net distribution of income.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between the cultural dimension individualism-
collectivism and net income inequality. All else equal, are individualist societies more likely
to have higher levels of income inequality compared to collectivist ones after taxes have
been redistributed? On the one hand, as it is commonly believed, we would expect to see
1In economics, the trade-off between efficiency and equality is well-established theoretically, e.g., see
Okun (2015).
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higher level of net income inequality in more individualistic societies, which tolerate greater
individual differences, favor less redistributive policies, and have social and market insti-
tutions that promote higher economic inequality. On the other hand, collectivist societies,
should have much lower net income inequality since individual preferences favor more redis-
tributive policies and encourage conformity and the status quo. Yet, as Fig. 1 shows, the
correlation between individualism and net income inequality across countries seems to go
in the opposite direction–with more individualist cultures having lower levels of net income
inequality. This empirical observation is quite puzzling in the face of an established litera-
ture, which shows that at the individual level there is a strong link between individualism
and preferences for redistribution (Lansley, 1994; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2005; Castell and Thompson, 2007; Quattrociocchi, 2014). It is possible, of
course, that the negative relationship in Figure 1 is spurious capturing some third variable
such as economic development that is unobserved. The graph is also merely correlational
and does not imply causality. Thus, the starting point of our analysis are the issues of
reverse causality and omitted variable bias.
Figure 1: Individualism and Income Inequality
Source: Data on inequality came from Solt (2016). Data on individualism were collected from https://geert-
hofstede.com/
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To deal with these issues, we propose a potential instrument, the historical prevalence
of infectious diseases, as a source of exogenous variation for individualistic values. There
is by now substantial evidence in support of the so called Parasite-Stress Theory of Values
(PSTV), according to which regional variation in infectious diseases influenced cultural
traits such as xenophobia, openness, and ethnocentrism that led to the formation of social
values associated with collectivism-individualism (Fincher et al., 2008), which, in the next
stage, shaped economic outcomes at the regional level. Our analysis, then, is based on a
rich literature in evolutionary psychology and biology that has identified the instrument
a priori (Thornhill and Fincher, 2014). Thus, our paper contributes to the literature on
the causes of economic inequality by suggesting that cross country differences in income
inequality today have their deep origins in the historical prevalence of infectious diseases,
which determined cultural values at the regional level.
Our results challenge the conventional view that individualistic societies are more prone
to higher levels of income inequality. On the contrary, we find that even if people in more
individualistic cultures are more likely to accept and encourage greater individual differ-
ences, they end up living in far more equal societies at the end of the day. In our 2SLS
analysis, we find that the historical prevalence of infectious diseases is strongly and neg-
atively correlated with individualistic values, which then, in the next stage, are a strong
determinant of economic inequality, measured by the net GINI coefficient from the Stan-
dardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). These results hold even when we
control for a number of confounding factors including the level of economic development,
social capital, formal institutions, local factor endowments, geographic dummies, and other
cultural values. The results are furthermore robust to different sub-samples of countries
and alternative measures of income inequality and individualism.
One possible explanation for these findings is that citizens in individualistic cultures
favor more inclusive institutions that are characterized by respect for the rights, liberties,
and well-being of all members of society, not just their immediate circle. This is consistent
with recent empirical findings which show that more individualistic societies are far more
likely to develop high quality political and economic institutions including respect for the
rule of law, protection of private property and strong democratic institutions (Greif, 1994;
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Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 2017; Kyriacou, 2016; Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 2016; Gorod-
nichenko and Roland, 2015; Licht et al., 2007; Inglehart and Oyserman, 2004). People in
more individualistic cultures are also more likely to tolerate minorities and have higher lev-
els of interpersonal trust and lower levels of corruption (Thornhill and Fincher, 2014; Allik
and Realo, 2004), which can further reduce transaction costs and facilitate market exchange
leading to higher rates of human and physical capital investment, technological innovation
and long-run economic growth (Oyserman et al., 2002; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2012)
and encouraging people to put more effort and get a fairer share of the economic pie (Alesina
and Angeletos, 2005). When citizens perceive state institutions to be fair, less corrupt, and
more efficient, they are far more likely to tolerate higher taxes and government spending on
welfare programs (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2012; Svallfors, 2013; Pitlik and Kouba, 2015;
Daniele and Geys, 2015; Pitlik and Rode, 2016). When they trust and care about the well-
being of their fellow citizens, they will be more inclined to support welfare programs that
benefit others. Finally, when people earn higher incomes, they are more likely to be able to
bear the burden of higher taxation while still maximizing their own talents through their
free choices.
Understanding the relationship between income inequality and cultural values such
as individualism-collectivism is important for several reasons. First, income inequality is
strongly correlated with many negative social outcomes such as the concentration of po-
litical power and rent-seeking in a society (Stiglitz, 2012; Bartels, 2009). More unequal
societies are also more likely to experience higher crime rates, diverging educational out-
comes, and lower levels of psychological well-being (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2010) as well as
lower levels of socio-economic mobility (OECD, 2011; Krueger, 2012; Dabla-Norris et al.,
2015). This is particularly troubling since the gap between the rich and the poor in both
developed and developing countries has been growing in recent decades (Bordia Das, 2013;
Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). By some measures, the 85 richest people in the world today
own as many assets as the poorest 3.5 billion people (Oxfam, 2014) and, according to the
World Economic Forum, the widening gap between the rich and the poor is now the most
significant challenge facing the world (World Economic Forum, 2015).
Second, individualism is one of the hallmarks of market capitalism and the values associ-
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ated with it provide the necessary incentives that drive competition, encourage innovation
and ultimately lead to economic growth and prosperity. Individual freedom is also the
foundation of liberal democracy and is in the core of the narrative that fuels the “American
dream.” Yet, individualistic values have also received a great deal of scrutiny (Schwartz,
2004).
Finally, while the developmental economics literature has identified a number of deter-
minants of income inequality such as human capital, legal origins, ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization, technology, factor endowments, globalization, economic growth, and neo-liberal
policies, far less is understood about the deep origins of economic inequality. In this paper,
we suggest one possible explanation that relies on the provocative PSTV hypothesis, which
has recently received significant support in the fields of biology and evolutionary psychology
(Thornhill and Fincher, 2014).2
2 The Parasite Stress Theory of Values
There is by now a sizable literature in biology and evolutionary psychology that supports
the theory that cross-country differences in cultural traits associated with the value dimen-
sion individualism-collectivism have their origins in the historical prevalence of infectious
diseases. Below, we briefly summarize the evidence for the so called Parasite Stress Theory
of Values (PSTV), which provides a strong foundation for the 2SLS analysis in this pa-
per. Thornhill and Fincher (2014) provide a comprehensive overview of this literature while
Nikolaev and Salahodjaev (2017) discuss the PSTV in the context of economic institutions.
Parasitic (infectious=pathogenic) stress accounts for more evolutionary action across
the human genome than any other environmental factor including climate, geography, diet
or subsistence strategies (Fumagalli et al., 2011). This is because in human evolutionary
history pathogens were a major source of morbidity and consequently of natural selection
2Our paper is closely related to a line of research originating from the seminal work of Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001) who use settler mortality to explain the deep origins of economic institutions. In this
paper, we add an additional layer of explanation of their hypothesis by linking the historical prevalence of
infectious diseases to cultural values associated with individualism. We also use a different instrument, which
while closely related to settler mortality is based on a rich literature in biology and evolutionary psychology.
Finally, we are more interested in the effect of cultural institutions and show that even when we control for
economic institutions, cultural values are strongly and significantly correlated with economic outcomes.
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(Wolfe et al., 2007; Volk and Atkinson, 2013).
There are two main ways in which humans adapted to parasitic stress: (1) adaptation of
the physiological immune system at the cellular level, and (2) adaptation of the behavioral
(psychological) immune system. This latter type of evolutionary adaptation allowed people
to avoid infectious diseases and manage their contagion (Schaller and Duncan, 2007; Fincher
and Thornhill, 2008). Examples of psychological adaptations include adaptive feelings (e.g.,
disgust), cognition (e.g., worry about contagion), and, more importantly, changes in atti-
tudes towards out-group and in-group members. Interpersonal forms of prejudice such as
xenophobia, ethnocentrism, or, more generally, prejudice against people who are perceived
unfamiliar, unclean, or unhealthy, are at least partially a result from this form of pathogen-
avoidance adaptations of the behavioral immune system (Thornhill and Fincher, 2014). A
series of experimental studies, for instance, show that when people perceive to be exposed to
infectious diseases, they are far more likely to display traits associated with ethnocentrism
(Navarrete and Fessler, 2006), the avoidance of outsiders such as immigrants (Faulkner
et al., 2004) and even people who are obese (Park et al., 2007). A large body of literature
also shows that parasitic stress is strongly correlated to changes in the psychology and social
behavior of many other species, including primates (e.g., see Loehle (1995)).
Since host-parasite arm races were geographically localized (Fincher et al., 2008), these
two types of evolutionary strategies of the host defense were most effective against local
parasite genotypes and less so against pathogens that evolved in out-group hosts. The
Parasite Stress Theory of Values, which was first introduced by Thornhill and Fincher
(2014), proposes that regions with high levels of parasitic stress were more likely to naturally
select personality traits such as xenophobia, neophobia, ethnocentrism, and, more generally,
values that disregard the well-being of out-group members, including those at the lower
end of the economic ladder. Traits like xenophobia and neophobia, for instance, not only
reduce economic transactions between groups and across-regions, but reward conformity
and obedience toward traditional order and discourage novelty. As a result, societies with
high degree of pathogenic stress were more likely to develop cultural traits associated with
collectivist values (Fincher et al., 2008) that view negatively ideas that can potentially
threaten the established social norms. Consequently, corruption, in-group favoritism, and
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even authoritarianism were more likely social outcomes (Thornhill et al., 2009). From an
evolutionary standpoint, these behavioral strategies were mechanisms to stop the spread of
infectious diseases.
Figure 2: Historical Prevalence of Infectious Diseases and Individualism
Source: Data on individualism were collected from https://geert-hofstede.com/. Data on the historical
prevalence of pathogens came from Murray et al. (2011).
Societies with low pathogenic stress, on the other hand, developed value systems asso-
ciated with social tolerance and trust of out-groups (Fincher et al., 2008). Such societies
were far more likely to favor inclusiveness and respect for the rights, liberties and well-being
of people from differences socio-economic classes, religion, or ethnicity. Cultural values fa-
vored openness to new ideas, even if these ideas came from out-groups. From an evolutionary
standpoint, this was a successful strategy because it provided social and economic benefits
by stimulating the free exchange of goods and services, promoting specialization of labor,
lowering transaction costs, and increasing cooperation with out-groups that further encour-
ages the diffusion of new knowledge. Figure 2 shows the strong correlation between the
historical prevalence of infectious diseases and individualistic values (r= - .63; p = 0.000).
A number of studies provide empirical support for the PSTV. For instance, Cashdan and
Steele (2013) show that people in societies with high degree of infectious diseases are more
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likely to raise children with collectivism values. van Leeuwen et al. (2012) show that high
prevalence of parasitic stress robustly predicts variety of cultural practices associated with
in-group favoritism. Simiarly, Fincher et al. (2008) find a strong link between the historical
prevalence of infectious diseases and the value dimension individualism-collectivism, with
societies that were exposed to less pathogenic stress developing strong individualistic values.
Furthermore, Murray et al. (2011) provide four separate tests that the origins of cultural
conformity are strongly correlated with the historical distribution infectious diseases across
countries in four separate empirical tests. Studies also find a strong link between parasitic
stress and authoritarian regimes (Murray et al., 2013; Thornhill et al., 2009). Finally, a more
indirect test for the PSTV hypothesis comes from the observation that regions located near
the equator, which have high degree of infectious diseases, are more likely to have collectivist
values compared to societies at higher latitudes (Hall and Jones, 1999).
Thus, the PSTV provides the critical link for our econometric estimations which are
based on the hypothesis that societies with low pathogenic stress were more likely to develop
cultural values that favor inclusive economic and political institutions (e.g., respect for the
rule of law, representative democracy, etc.), higher levels of social tolerance and trust, which
can then lead not only to higher investment in human and physical capital, and long-run
growth, but also to the natural selection of personality traits that favor respect for the
rights, liberties, and well-being of all members of society, not just members of the family or
the clan.
Theoretically, then, the effect of individualistic values on income inequality is ambiguous.
On the one hand, tolerance for individual differences and pro-market economic institutions
that encourage people to innovate and be rewarded with extraordinary wealth as well as
anti-interventionist attitudes can lead to higher income inequality. On the other hand, more
inclusive economic and political institutions, lower levels of corruption, higher investment
in human capital, tolerance for minorities, greater levels of social trust, and less in-group
favoritism can lead to lower levels of income inequality. Figure 3 shows this mechanism.
To test this hypothesis, we use a two stage least squares (2SLS) model in which we use
the historical prevalence of infectious diseases as a source of regional exogenous variation
for cultural values, which we proxy with the multifaceted value system of individualism-
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Figure 3: Pathogens, Individualism and Income Inequality
collectivism. As Oishi et al. (1998) define it, collectivism is characterized by strong values
placed on tradition and conformity while individualism is defined by greater tolerance for
deviations from the status quo. IC values, then, in the next stage, explain differences in
income inequality across countries.
3 Data
Below we provide a brief overview of the main variables used in this study.
3.1 Income Inequality
Measures of income inequality vary tremendously within and across countries. Deininger
and Squire (1996), for instance, identify more than 2600 calculations of Gini coefficients that
have been made across countries and over time. Some of these calculations use national
samples, others rely on rural or urban samples; some are at the household level, others at
the individual level; some are based on expenditures while others use income. Thus, one
of the biggest challenges in cross-country studies on income inequality has been the lack of
comparable data.
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In this study, we use the net Gini coefficient from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database v.4 (SWIID) as a measure of net income inequality (Solt, 2016). The 
SWIID dataset incorporates and standardizes data from a large number of sources such as 
the United Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database, the OECD Income 
Distribution Database, the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
generated by CEDLAS and the World Bank, Eurostat, the World Bank‘s PovcalNet, the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, national statistical offices 
around the world, and academic studies while minimizing reliance on problematic 
assumptions by using as much information as possible from proximate years within the same 
country. The data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study is employed as the standard. 
Thus, the SWIID dataset maximizes the comparability of income inequality data while 
maintaining the widest possible coverage across countries and over time. In our dataset 
income inequality ranges from 18.47 in Mauritius to 62.77 in Namibia. The mean global net 
GINI coefficient is 39 (median level is 40).
3.2 Historical Prevalence of Infectious Diseases
The measure of historical prevalence of infectious diseases is based on the index de-
veloped by Murray and Schaller (2010), which shows the magnitude to which nine infec-
tious diseases (leishmanias, schistosomes, trypanosomes, leprosy, malaria, typhus, filariae, 
dengue, and tuberculosis) have been historically prevalent within countries. This index is 
estimated based on the regional pathogen prevalence data derived from old epidemiological 
maps provided in Rodenwaldt and Bader (1952-1961) and summarized by Simmons et al.
(1944).
To ensure the comparability across different diseases, the pathogens prevalence data was 
brought down to a common unit of measurement. To do so, Murray and Schaller (2010) 
first standardize pathogen prevalence ratings by converting them to z scores. In the next 
stage, the overall pathogen prevalence index is estimated as the simple average of z scores 
of the nine diseases. Thus, the mean of the overall index is close to 0, with positive values 
suggesting that the historical prevalence of pathogens is higher than the mean, and negative 
scores indicating disease prevalence that is lower than the mean.
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To establish validity, Murray and Schaller (2010) show that their index is strongly
correlated (r= 0.90) with the disease prevalence index by Gangestad and Buss (1993) and
with the contemporary parasite prevalence index (r= 0.84) by Fincher et al. (2008). In this
study, we prefer the index by Murray and Schaller (2010) because it is available for almost
100 nations and geopolitical regions.
3.3 Individualism-Collectivism
The best known international measure of individualism and collectivism is the one orig-
inally developed by Hofstede (1980) who initially focused on how values in the workplace
are shaped by culture. As suggested by Hofstede et al. (1991) “individualism pertains to
societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after
himself or herself and his or her immediate family.” In contrast, collectivism “pertains to
societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups,
which throughout people‘s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning
loyalty.”
To collect these data, Hofstede and co-authors originally disseminated questionnaires
among 100,000 IBM employees worldwide. Based on answers to fourteen “work goal” ques-
tions, the authors obtained IC scores for 40 countries. To avoid cultural bias, the translation
of the questions was done by a team of English and local language speakers. While the orig-
inal survey was based on IBM employees, subsequent waves of the survey and replication
studies included a variety of sub-groups such as airline pilots, students, civil service man-
agers, and “up-market” consumers and elites (Hofstede, 2010). The most current version of
the international values survey module (2013) includes 24 values questions that respondents
rate on a scale from 1=most important to 5=least important.3 Using factor analysis, Hofst-
ede finds that the index of individualism is the first factor (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.770) that
emerges in questions about the value of personal time, freedom, achievement, interesting
and fulfilling work, etc. Thus, Hofstede et al. (1991) suggest that there are a number of
key differences between collectivist and individualist societies that they summarize in two
categories: (1) general norms, family, school, and workplace, and (2) politics and ideas.
3These questionnaire can be found at http://www.geerthofstede.nl/.
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Table A1 in the supplementary Appendix provides a summary of these differences.
Although Hofstede’s data were originally collected to study differences in IBM’s corpo-
rate culture, the main advantage of using this measure of individualism-collectivism is that
it has been replicated in a number of other studies–e.g., by Hoppe (1990) on parliaments,
labor and employer leaders, academics and artists in 18 countries, by Shane (1995) across
28 countries for international companies other than IBM, by Merritt (2000) on commercial
airline pilots in 19 countries, by van Nimwegen (2002) among employees of an international
bank in 19 countries, by Wu (2006) on employees from US and Taiwanese universities,
by Mouritzen and Svara (2002) among municipal public servants in 14 coutnries, and by
De Mooij (2010) among consumers in 15 European countries.
Hofstede’s scores have been also used extensively in the cross-country empirical liter-
ature. His theory has become the paradigm for research in several fields including cross-
cultural psychology, international management, entrepreneurship, etc. and his cultural
dimensions have been used in over 2000 studies. Recently, research in economics (Gorod-
nichenko and Roland, 2011) has also focused and used extensively the Hofstede’s measure
of individualism-collectivism.
Since the individualism-collectivism component loads positively on values such as indi-
vidual freedom, opportunity, achievement, advancement, recognition, and loads negatively
on values such as harmony, cooperation, and relations with supervisors, Gorodnichenko and
Roland (2012) note that, broadly defined, individualism emphasizes the values of personal
freedom, affective autonomy, and achievement. In that sense, individualistic cultures award
social status to personal achievements such as innovation, discoveries, or artistic achieve-
ments with high social status (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2012).
A stylized empirical fact that emerged from a series of follow-up studies is that devel-
oped and industrialized nations are more likely to be associated with greater prevalence of
individualism whereas less developed, traditional and agricultural societies are more likely
to preserve collectivistic values (Hofstede et al., 1991). The empirical literature since then
has successfully linked individualistic cultural traits to better quality political and economic
institutions, long-run economic growth, and higher levels of social capital (Gorodnichenko
and Roland, 2011; Ball, 2001; Mazar and Aggarwal, 2011; Van Hoorn, 2014; Allik and Realo,
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2004; Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 2017; Thornhill and Fincher, 2014).
In this study, we use the most recently updated dataset from Hofstede et al. (1991)
which covers close to 100 countries.4 The IC scores are standardized and rescaled from 0
(most collectivistic) and 100 (most individualistic). Figure 4 presents a heat map for the
worldwide distribution of IC scores.
Figure 4: Individualism across Countries
3.4 Control Variables
To reduce potential omitted variable bias we also incorporate a vector of antecedents of
income inequality that have been drawn from the extant literature. This set of control vari-
ables includes legal origins, GDP per capita, latitude, local factor endowments, economic
institutions, human capital, ethnic diversity, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and religious
denominations (La Porta et al., 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Sturm and De Haan,
2015; Gallup et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2012). Because the
variables for the main analytical part of this study–individualism and the historical preva-
lence of pathogens–are available for less than 100 countries, once we merge our dataset and
eliminate missing observations, we are left with up to 88 observations. Adding additional
variables such as local factor endowments furthermore decreases our dataset to 71 countries.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
4The most recent dataset can be found at https://geert-hofstede.com/.
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4 Empirical Estimates
In this section, we report the results from our empirical estimations. First, we present
some descriptive evidence that individualism is strongly and significantly correlated with
income inequality using a standard least squares estimator. In the next stage, we re-
estimate the association between income inequality and cultural values using a two stage
least square (2SLS) estimator in which we use the historical prevalence of infectious diseases
as an instrument for IC values.
4.1 IC Values and Income Inequality: OLS Estimates
We start the analysis by estimating a conventional cross-country regression model where
net income inequality (Inequalityc) is a function of IC values (Individualismc) and a vector
of control variables (Controlsc) as discussed above. The econometric model can be expressed
as:
Inequalityc = µ+ αIndividualismc + Controlsc + c (1)
where α is the main coefficient of interest which shows the association between individualism
and net income inequality, and c is a random error term satisfying normality assumptions.
The results are displayed in Table 2. Column (1) reports a simple bivariate regression
model where the net Gini coefficient is regressed only on the IC index and suggests a
significant negative association between the two. The results imply that one standard
deviation increase in the IC index is associated with more than a half standard deviation
decrease in income inequality. The R-squared furthermore indicates that the IC index
alone explains nearly 30 percent of global variations in income inequality. This negative
effect remains strong and significant when we control for legal origins (column 2), latitude
(column 3), as well as economic development, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and the
share of population that belongs to different religious denomination (column 4), variables
that have been previously found to be correlated with economic inequality in the extant
literature (La Porta et al., 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Sturm and De Haan, 2015;
Gallup et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 1999).
14
An important theory that explains the persistence of income inequality over time comes
from the work of economic historians Engerman and Sokoloff (2012) who hypothesize that
contemporary inequality has its deep origins in local factor endowments such as climate,
geography and natural resources. More specifically, when factor endowments were favorable
for the establishment of large slave plantations and/or mines, the economic and political
elite established rules and policies intended to promote their own economic interests. This,
in turn, created inequality before the law characterized by unfavorable and biased access
to private property rights, contract enforcement, and corrupt judicial system. Inequality
before the law, then, stifled economic mobility by hindering access to economic opportuni-
ties for the masses creating a culture characterized by persistently high levels of economic
inequality for subsequent generations.5 On the other hand, when factor endowments were
more favorable for small scale farming that could efficiently grow grains such as wheat and
corn, then property rights we more evenly distributed across all income classes. A related
story is the settlement conditions hypothesis by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), who argue
that the settlement conditions faced by European colonists ultimately affected the develop-
ment of economic institutions such as the protection of property rights. When settlement
conditions were favorable, European colonists had a much greater incentives to settle per-
manently and to develop more inclusive economic institutions which respected the rights
and liberties of all income classes.
Thus, in column 5, we furthermore control for economic institutions and local factor
endowments. As a measure of economic institutions, we use the index of Economic Freedom
published by the Heritage Foundation, which is a complex composite indicator that assesses
the quality of the institutional environment based four basic pillars–rule of law, regulatory
efficiency, government size, and open markets. As a measure of local factor endowments we
use a measure for the suitability of land and climate for growing wheat relative to sugarcane
(wheat-sugar), a variable that was originally developed by Easterly (2007).6 Even after
controlling for the quality of economic institutions and local factor endowments, we find
5Easterly (2007) calls this type of persistent inequality, structural inequality. This hypothesis has recently
received support in the empirical literature (Bennett and Nikolaev, 2016).
6Wheat-sugar is measured as the log of the ratio of one plus the share of arable land suitable for the
growth of wheat plus the share of arable land suitable for growing sugar.
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that individualism is negatively and significantly correlated (at the 5 percent level) with
net income inequality.
Finally, we control for a number of possible channels through which individualism can
possibly affect income inequality such as human capital, innovation, trade freedom, corrup-
tion, and property rights. Once we do this, our individualism index loses its significance
and the magnitude of the effect become negligible, suggesting that many of the benefits of
individualism possible work through these channels. This result, however, is expected since
these are major channels through which individualism might affect income inequality as we
suggest in our theoretical section. We provide further tests for these channels in section 4.6
where we show that our individualism measure is strongly and significantly correlated with
these channels.
[Table 2 around here]
The estimates reported in Table 2 provide strong support for a significant association
between cultural values, measured by our IC index, and income inequality, measured by
the net GINI coefficient. Of course, these results are merely correlational and do not imply
causality. It could be argued, for instance, that countries with a more equal distribution
of income foster social institutions which nurture collectivist values. In this case, however,
the relationship should go in the opposite direction. Yet, it is possible that in more equal
societies, individuals may have more opportunities to succeed on their own and it might be
more natural for individualistic values to develop. Moreover, mean regression estimators
ignore potentially unobserved variables that can be correlated with both individualism and
income inequality simultaneously causing omitted variable bias.
One way to address this issue is to identify an external instrument for IC values that is
strongly correlated with individualism/collectivism, but uncorrelated with all unobserved
antecedents of income inequality. In other words, this instrument should have an effect
on income inequality only through its direct effect on individualism and not through other
channels that are unobserved in our regressions.
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4.2 Two Stage Least Squares Estimations
In this sub-section, we use the historical prevalence of infectious diseases, proxied with
the pathogen index by Murray and Schaller (2010), as an instrumental variable (IV) for IC
cultural values, which then predict income inequality, measured by the net GINI coefficient,
in the second stage. Section 2 provides rationale for the use of this IV based on the
provocative Parasite-Stress Theory of Values, which suggests that the historical prevalence
of pathogens affects the net distribution of income through the channel of cultural values.
Since contemporary levels of income inequality are not likely to influence the historical
variations of infectious diseases across countries, we are also less worried about reverse
causality.
The exclusion restriction implied by our instrumental variable estimation is that, condi-
tional on other controls in our model, the historical prevalence of infectious disease has no
effect on income inequality today other than its effect through the individualism-collectivism
dimension of cultural values. However, there are two main limitations to our analysis. First,
our instrument may be correlated with the current health of nations which is related to in-
come inequality. Second, pathogens may be linked to other cultural values that may predict
income inequality. As we show later in our analysis, however, even when we control for the
current level of the health of nations and additional cultural dimensions, individualism is
still significantly and negatively correlated with income inequality. This seems to support
the findings of a number of previous studies described in section 2.
Equations (2) and (3) illustrate the first and second-stages of our model. In the first
stage, we regress our IC index, Individualismc, on the historical prevalence of infectious
disease index, Pathogensc and a set of controls, Controlsc, similar to the ones in equa-
tion (1). In the next stage, we use the predicted values of our IC index, ̂Individualismc,
to estimate net income inequality, Inequalityc while controlling for a set of confounding
variables.
Individualismc = βPathogensc + Controlsc + c (2)
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Inequalityc = α ̂Individualismc + Controlsc + νc (3)
The 2SLS estimates are presented in Table 3. Panel A of Table 3 provides the results
from the second stage regression while Panel B presents the first stage results. Across all
specification we document that the historical prevalence of infectious diseases is inversely
related to the IC score in the first stage as predicted by the PSTV, which then is a significant
predictor of income inequality in the second stage. If causal, the results from the bivariate
specification in column (1), for instance, suggest that when our IC index increase by one
standard deviation, income inequality declines by 9 percentage points, approximately one
standard deviation. Turning to control variables, we find that compared to countries with
Dutch legal origins, countries with Napoleonic and British common law are associated with
higher levels of net income inequality. After controlling for religion, geography, economic
development, the quality of the institutional environment, and local factor endowments,
income inequality is still higher in more developed countries.
Here, it is important to note that the magnitudes suggested by our OLS estimations
are smaller (on a magnitude of 4) compared to our 2SLS estimates. One possible reason
for this difference has to do with the nature of the estimation procedure. OLS estimates
the average treatment effect (over the entire population) while the 2SLS coefficients show
estimates of the local average treatment effect, which could be larger for a sub-sample of
countries (i.e., the local treatment effect is larger because the IV may affect only certain
countries within our sample for which the effect of becoming more individualistic is much
higher than the average effect over the entire population). In fact, additional tests based
on a procedure outlined by Huang et al. (2017) allowed us to calculate that the proportion
of “compliers” is 42.3 percent.7
[Table 3 around here]
The F-test statistic presented at the bottom of Table 3 assesses the credibility of our
instrument. In the case of a single instrument and a single endogenous regressor, the t-value
7This analysis is available upon request.
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of the instrument should be greater than 3.2, i.e., the rule of thumb is that the F-statistic
of the joint test whether all excluded instruments are significant should be greater than
10 (Staiger and Stock, 1994). This is the case in all five models, which provides further
confidence for the choice of instrument in our study.
4.3 Robustness with Additional Controls
There are two main challenges to the empirical estimations so far. First, while it is
highly unlikely that regional variation in the historical prevalence of infectious diseases
directly influenced differences in income inequality today, it is possible that the current
health of nations, which might influence income inequality today, is strongly correlated with
the historical prevalence of infectious diseases. Second, it is also likely that the historical
prevalence of infectious diseases influenced other cultural values which then influenced the
net distribution of income. In both cases, our IV variable, the historical prevalence of
parasitic stress, will be correlated with the error term in the second stage of our 2SLS
model and our results will be biased.
To address these issues, in Table 4 we re-estimate our main model from Table 2 by
including a number of variables that proxy other cultural dimensions and the current health
of nations. Model 1, for instance, controls for life expectancy as a measure of the current
health of nations. Model 2 controls for the share of the population living in the tropics.
Societies located around the tropics are subject to a larger number of infectious diseases
compared to societies at higher latitudes (Thornhill and Fincher, 2014) and this variable
has previously been linked to income inequality (Easterly and Levine, 2003). In models 3
to 6 we control for other cultural dimensions such as masculinity, uncertainty, long term
orientation and indulgence (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2001). We do not include the cultural
dimension Power Distance, which represents the degree to which the less powerful members
of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally, because in our sample
individualism and power distance are highly correlated (r=-0.79, p=0.000) likely capturing
similar cultural values. Finally, in column 7 we include all of these additional controls in one
specification and close the channels through which pathogens can affect income inequality.
In all instances, the coefficient on our individualism-collectivism index remains negative and
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statistically significant at conventional levels. These findings are consistent with previous
research which finds that the IC dimension of culture is the most robust determinant of
different economic outcomes including long-run growth (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011)
and the quality of economic and political institutions (Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 2017).
It is possible, of course, that other omitted cultural variables are correlated with both the
historical prevalence of infectious diseases and income inequality, which would violate the
exclusion restriction. As most studies in cultural psychology and more recently economics,
however, we believe that the IC dimension is the most important one in the context of the
PSTV theory (Thornhill and Fincher, 2014).
4.4 Robustness with Sub-Samples
Up to this point, we have ignored potential heterogeneity across countries in our sample.
It is possible of course that individualism may exert different impact on income inequality
across different regions. Therefore, we replicate our 2SLS estimations by taking into ac-
count the role of geography. The results are reported in Table 5. The effect of instrumented
individualism on net GINI remains negative and significant when we include regional dum-
mies (column 1), exclude Africa (column 2), North America (column 4), South America
(column 5) and finally potential influential observations (column 7) 8. However, this effect
is only marginally significant when we exclude Asia (column 3) and is insignificant when
we exclude Europe (column 6). One possible explanation for the result in column 6 is that
majority of the individualistic countries in our sample are located in Europe. Removing
this observations leaves us with very little variation in the individualism variable, which
explains the insignificant results.
[Table 5 around here]
4.5 Alternative Measures of Inequality
Even though the Gini coefficient has been the most popular measure of the distribution
of income, there are a number of limitations to using it as a measure of income inequality.
8Figure A1 in the Appendix shows a plot of the normalized residuals and their leverage, which helps us
identify influential observations
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For example, because the Gini coefficient is a relative measure, it is possible that inequality
in a country increases while at the same time the absolute level of living standards improves,
including those at the bottom of the income distribution. Similarly, growing income inequal-
ity can be due to structural changes in society related to population growth or immigration.
De Maio (2007) provides an excellent review of the limitations of the Gini coefficient and
suggests a number of alternative measures including the Atkinson index of inequality, the
generalized entropy index, and others. Unfortunately, none of these alternative measures
are available for a large cross-section of countries.
A more general concern is whether our results will replicate with alternative measures
of income inequality for different years. Therefore, in Table 6 we provide several additional
tests using alternative measures of income inequality for different years. In column 1, we
present our baseline results with the net Gini coefficient. Next, in column 2, we use a
Gini measure of gross household income inequality from the University of Texas Inequality
project (Galbraith and Kum, 2005). In column 3, we use the ratio of the average income
or share of expenditures of the richest 10 percent to the poorest 10 percent of income
earners, the so called 90/10 ratio, from the 2009 Human Development Report. Finally, in
column 4, we use the 80-20 ratio, the ratio of the average income of the richest 20 percent
to the poorest 20 percent, from the 2007 Human Development Report. In all models, the
coefficient on income inequality is negative and statistically significant and, overall, the
results are consistent with our previous findings, which provides further confidence in the
findings so far.9
[Table 6 around here]
4.6 Alternative Measures of Individualism
Despite widely used in the literature, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions model has also re-
ceived criticism (Schwartz, 1994). Therefore, in this section, we provide additional robust-
9In additional tests, not reported here, we used as an alternative measure of income inequality the long-
run average for net Gini coefficient from SWIID. The results remained virtually the same likely because the
correlation between our preferred measure of income inequality and its long-run average is close to perfect,
r=0.86. In other words, even if income inequality has changed over time, the SWIID data suggests that
income inequality has likely changed in the same direction and magnitude over time, keeping cross-country
differences very similar to what we find today.
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ness tests using three alternative measures of individualism-collectvism. These measures
are based on Schwartz’s cultural orientation scale, which was derived from an extensive list
of 56-57 single value items that ask respondents to indicate the importance of each values
as “a guiding principle in my life.” (Schwartz, 1994). Schwartz and collaborators conducted
surveys with K-12 schoolteachers and college students between 1998 and 2000 that covered
more than 75,000 respondents from 78 countries and 70 cultural groups representing close
to 80 percent of the world population.
Similar to the individualism-collectivism dimension from Hofstede et al. (1991), Schwartz
differentiates cultures according to an autonomy-embeddedness dimension. Autonomous
(individualistic) cultures are ones where people are seen as autonomous and independent
entities. In such cultures, people are encouraged to cultivate and express their own pref-
erences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and derive meaning from their own uniqueness. Em-
bedded (collectivist) cultures, on the other hand, are ones where people find meaning by
identifying with the group, participating in a shared way of life, and striving towards shared
goals. In embedded societies high value is placed on the status quo and avoiding individ-
ual actions that might undermine traditional order. The autonomy index consists of two
sub-indexes–one on affective autonomy and another one on intellectual autonomy. Affec-
tive autonomy measures the extent to which people are encouraged to seek enjoyment and
pleasure for themselves by any means while the intellectual autonomy index measures the
extent to which people are encouraged to pursue independent ideas and thoughts, whether
theoretical or political. Countries that score high on autonomy also score low on intellectual
and affective autonomy.
Thus, as an alternative measure of individualism-collectivism, we use the the index
of autonomy-embeddedness and its two sub-indexes on affective and intellectual autonomy.
These additional tests are reported in Table 7. In all three cases, we find that more culturally
autonomous (embedded) countries are far more likely to have lower (higher) levels of income
inequality, which is consistent with our previous findings.
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4.7 Robustness, Possible Channels
In section 2, we suggested several possible channels through which IC values can affect
income inequality, specifically, the quality of social and economic institutions, human capi-
tal, and economic growth. In Table 8, we test the association between IC values and several
of these channels. We first show that more individualistic societies are less likely to have
cultural values associated with the cultural dimension power distance, which represents the
degree to which less powerful members of society accept that power is distributed unequally
in a society. The results imply that people in more individualistic countries are less likely
to accept a higher degree of unequally distributed power such as political power than do
people in collectivist cultures. We then show that more individualistic societies are more
likely to have greater protection of property rights, a measure often used to evaluate the
quality of economic institutions, experience lower levels of corruption, are more open to
trade internationally, are more likely to invest in human capital, and experience higher level
of innovation. These results are consistent with our theoretical discussion in section 2 and
previous empirical studies. We provide these additional estimations with the caveat that
our IV may not be appropriate for picking up a causal association between individualism
and these possible channels.
[Table 8 around here]
5 Concluding Remarks
The idea that culture plays an important role for economic development has its origins
in the works of Adam Smith, David Hume, Karl Marx, Max Weber,10 Thorstein Veblen,
Friedrich Hayek, and many other early economists and social psychologists from different
schools of thought. Cultural values, just like economic, political and legal institutions, as
defined by North (1990), impose norms on individual behavior and structure incentives
10As Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012) point out, the importance of culture has been recognized at least
since the seminal work of Max Weber, who argued that the protestant ethic of Calvinism was a powerful force
behind the development of capitalism in its early stages. But even Adam Smith discussed the importance
of culture to generate language, moral norms, and an individual’s very capacity for self-awareness and
self-efficacy.
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in human interaction and exchange. In that sense, cultural values can influence human
behavior and thus the distribution of entrepreneurial talent to different productive and
unproductive activities (Baumol, 1996), affecting how society invests in human and physical
capital as well as technology.
It is widely believed that individualistic cultures, which emphasize personal freedom,
award social status for accomplishment, and favor minimal government intervention, are
more prone to higher levels of income inequality compared to more collectivist societies,
which value conformity, loyalty, and tradition and favor interventionist policies. Yet, as we
show in this paper, simple bi-variate correlations suggest that more individualistic societies
have much more equitable distribution of income than collectivist ones. In this paper, we
examine this empirical puzzle within the context of the provocative Parasite Stress Theory
of of Values (Thornhill and Fincher, 2014), which suggests that the historical prevalence of
infectious diseases influenced the natural selection of cultural traits associated with indi-
vidualistic and collectivistic values, which, then, in the next stage, explained cross-country
differences in income inequality.
Our analysis suggests that societies with more individualistic values have significantly
lower level of net income inequality. The results are robust even after controlling for a
number of confounding factors such as economic development, legal origins, religion, eco-
nomic institutions, local factor endowments, and geographical controls as well as a number
of alternative estimations that account for influential observations. They are also consistent
when we use alternative measures of income inequality and individualism. It is important to
note that these results do not suggest that cultural values alone explain today’s differences
in income inequality across countries. Our results, however, imply that variation in income
inequality across countries has its origins in the historical prevalence of infectious diseases
and the cultural values that emerged through the evolutionary process of natural selection
which made some countries develop more individualistic values and ideologies while others
became more collectivistic.
One implication of our study is that preferences for a more equal society do not directly
translate into a more equal society. For instance, preferences for redistribution in many
formal communist societies such as Bulgaria and Romania remain relatively high, yet income
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inequality in many of these countries is relatively high. The Public Choice literature provides
a possible explanation–using government as a mechanism to redistribute wealth may not
necessarily create a more equal society beyond some optimal point, despite the fact that one
of the most salient features of modern governments is redistributing income and promoting
equality of opportunity (Mueller Dennis, 2003). As public choice scholars note, beyond some
optimal level, larger government may be welfare reducing11 and create even larger disparities
in equality of opportunity because most political actors have a vested interest in larger
government, not optimal government. Politicians and bureaucrats, for instance, are largely
motivated by their own self-interest and are prone to political capture by special interest
groups that look for regulations and policies that provide them with an economic advantage
over other groups and competitors in society (Mueller Dennis, 2003; Niskanen, 1971; Olson,
1971; Tullock, 1998; Downs, 1962) potentially generating higher levels of income inequality.
Recent studies have also emphasized that much of the growth in income inequality has
political origins (Stiglitz, 2012). In other words, only because people want a more equal
society does not necessarily mean that they will get one. Instead, the quality of formal
institutions can mediate this relationship and recent studies suggest that in countries where
people have trust in the public sector, they are far more likely to be willing to pay higher
taxes and trust government officials to do the right thing (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2012;
Svallfors, 2013; Pitlik and Kouba, 2015; Daniele and Geys, 2015; Pitlik and Rode, 2016).
As Alesina and Angeletos (2005) point out “if a society believes that individual effort
determines income, and that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, [which
are major features of individualism], it will choose low redistribution and low taxes. In
equilibrium, effort will be high, the role of luck limited, market outcomes will be quite
fair, and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If instead a society believes that luck, birth,
connections and/or corruption determine wealth, it will tax a lot, thus distorting allocations
and making these beliefs self-sustained as well.” In other words, the quality of formal and
informal institutions, which a large literature argues have historical origins, can influence
people’s beliefs about the type of society they live in. When people believe that societal
11Bjørnskov et al. (2007), for example, find that government consumption is negatively associated with
life satisfaction.
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institutions are fair, they will be far more likely to learn new skills, innovate, develop their
talents, and put the necessary effort required to capture a more fair share of the economic
pie.
As we suggest in this paper, the PTSD hypothesis suggests one potential and plausible
mechanism that is based on a very rich literature in biology and evolutionary psychology.
That is, people in more individualistic societies are less likely to share cultural values such
as xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and more generally disregard for the well-being of out-group
minorities. There is a long history of discrimination of minorities in collectivist societies
(e.g., gypsies in Eastern Europe, Tibetans and Uyghur minorities in China, and great many
ethnic and racial conflicts in Africa, which happens to be the place with the greatest history
of pathogenic stress). At the same time, some of the most individualist societies in our
sample (e.g., Sweden or UK) have relatively lower levels of inequality (and this relationship
holds even after we control for economic development, institutions, legal origins, geography.)
One possible explanation for these findings is that individualistic cultures are more likely
to develop inclusive economic, social, and political institutions, which respect the rights,
liberties, and well-being of all members of society, not just of those in their immediate
family or clan. This is consistent with recent findings which show that more individualistic
societies are far more likely to have high quality political and economic institutions including
respect for the rule of law, lower levels of corruption, and strong democratic institutions
(Greif, 1994; Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 2017; Kyriacou, 2016; Nikolaev and Salahodjaev,
2016; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2015; Licht et al., 2007; Inglehart and Oyserman, 2004).
People in more individualistic cultures are also more likely to tolerate minorities and have
higher levels of interpersonal trust (Thornhill and Fincher, 2014; Allik and Realo, 2004),
which can reduce transaction costs and further facilitate market transactions leading to
higher rates of innovation and economic growth (Oyserman et al., 2002; Gorodnichenko
and Roland, 2012). When citizens perceive state institutions to be fair, less corrupt, and
more efficient, they are far more likely to favor higher taxes and government spending on
welfare programs (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2012; Svallfors, 2013; Pitlik and Kouba, 2015;
Daniele and Geys, 2015; Pitlik and Rode, 2016). When they trust and care about the well-
being of their fellow citizens, they will be more inclined to support welfare programs that
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benefit others. When they earn higher incomes, they are also more likely to be able to bear
the burden of higher taxation.
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Source/Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini (net) 
Net Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of 
income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among 
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly 
equal distribution. Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an 
index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 
Standardized 
World Income 
Inequality 
Database 
v.5(SWIID) / 
Solt (2014) 
39.261 9.404 18.473 62.774 
Individualism 
Index that measures the degree to which a society accepts and 
reinforces individualist or collectivist values. The index ranges from 0 
(most collectivistic) and 100 (most individualistic) 
 Hofstede et al. 
(2010) / 2010 39.170 22.075 6 91 
Pathogens 
Index measuring the historical prevalence of infectious diseases in a 
particular country. When available the pathogen index is derived from 
epidemiological maps of infectious diseases before the introduction of 
modern medicine. Therefore, Murray and Schaller's (2010) dataset 
provides a robust deep-rooted measure of the historical prevalence of 
infectious diseases. These epidemiological maps and summaries 
presented in Simmons et al. (1944). 
Murray and 
Schaller (2010) 0.15 0.66 -1.31 1.17 
Legal Origins  Legal origins dummies for UK, France, Socialist, German, and Scandinavian = 1 if legal origin; 0 otherwise 
La Porta et al. 
(2000) 0.174 0.380 0 1 
Latitude  Value of the latitude of a country's approximate geodesic centroid   La Porta et al. (2000) 19.062 24.215 -41.806 74.728 
Log GDP per capita  The logged value of GDP per capita, PPP  World Bank/ 2013 9.193 1.219 6.340 11.807 
Percent Muslim  Share of population Muslim La Porta et al. (2000)  21.725 35.050 0 99.9 
Percent Catholic  Share of population Catholic  La Porta et al. (2000) 31.493 35.502 0 99.1 
Percent Protestant  Share of population protestant  La Porta et al. (2000) 15.151 23.730 0 99.8 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 
 Index that captures the probability that two individuals, selected at 
random from a country's population, will belong to different ethnic 
groups 
Alesina et al. 
(2003) 0.439 0.258 0 0.930 
Economic Freedom 
 Index of economic freedom evaluates countries on broad dimensions 
of economic environment over which governments typically exercise 
policy control. Values range from 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). 
 Heritage 
Foundation / 
2014 
60.696 10.343 29.6 89.6 
Human Capital  Average years of schooling  Barro and Lee (2013) / 2013 6.524 2.933 0.864 12.686 
Power Distance This index measures the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.  
 Hofstede et al. 
(2010) / 2010 64.240 21.011 11 100 
Property Rights 
 Sub index of economic freedom which measures the degree to which a 
country’s laws protect private property rights and the extent to which 
those laws are respected. 
 Heritage 
Foundation / 
2014 
42.235 24.866 5 95 
Corruption Index  Sub index of economic freedom which measures the extent to which 
corruption prevails in a country. 
 Heritage 
Foundation / 
2014 
42.021 19.639 6.7 91 
Global Innovation Index  The Global innovation index ranks the innovation performance of 
countries and economies 
 
 Cornell 
University, 
INSEAD and 
WIPO (2015) / 
2015 
37.133 11.647 15 68.3 
Life Expectancy Average life expectancy 
World Bank, 
2013 71.147 8.569 48.938 83.831 
Tropics Share of population living in the tropics 
Ashraf & Galor 
(2013) 0.471 0.477 0 1 
Wheat-Sugar 
Suitability of climate and land endowments for growth wheat relative to 
sugar. Measured as: log[(1 +share of arable land suitable for wheat)/(1 +share 
of arable land suitable for sugarcane)].  
Easterly (2007) 
 
0.172 0.16 0 0.58 
UTIP 
Gross household income Gini coefficient. Predicted from econometric 
relationship between manufacturing pay inequality, Gini coefficients 
from the World Income Inequality Database, and other independent 
variables. 
Galbraith and 
Kum (2005) 
 
42.90 6.69 25.99 64.25 
90/10 The ratio of the average income of the richest 10% to the poorest 10% 
 
Human 
Development 
Report (2009) 
20.121 16.87 4.08 86.01 
80/20 The ratio of the average income of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% 
 
Human 
Development 
Report 
(2007/2008) 
10.138 6.589 3.09 37.32 
Embeddedness (vs Autonomy) 
Index that reflects the extent to which people are in a collectivity and 
find meaning through identifying with the group, participating in a 
shared way of life, and striving towards shared goals. In embedded 
societies high value is placed on the status quo and avoiding individual 
actions that might undermine traditional order. Values range from 0 
(not at all important) to 6 (very important). 
Schwartz (2008) 
 
 
3.80 0.39 3.01 4.63 
Affective Autonomy 
Index of affective autonomy that reflects the extent to which people are 
encouraged to pursue pleasure, seek enjoyment by any means. Values 
range from 0 (not at all important) to 6 (very important). 
Schwartz (2008) 
 
3.42 0.51 2.13 4.39 
Intellectual Autonomy 
Index of affective autonomy that reflects the extent to which people are 
encouraged to pursue independent ideas and thoughts, whether 
theoretical or political. Values range from 0 (not at all important) to 6 
(very important). 
Schwartz (2008) 
 
4.31 0.38 3.58 5.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: OLS Results, Individualism and Income Inequality (Net GINI) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
 Dependent Variable: Income Inequality (Net GINI) 
       
Individualism -0.238*** -0.184*** -0.141*** -0.144*** -0.114** -0.029 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.040) (0.048) (0.061) (0.050) 
Legal origins: Socialist  0.611 1.332 0.908 0.567 0.639 
  (1.897) (1.853) (2.025) (2.280) (2.760) 
Legal origins: French  9.210*** 6.756*** 8.606*** 6.620** 4.204 
  (1.719) (1.755) (2.216) (2.649) (2.642) 
Legal origins: UK  12.315*** 8.881*** 8.060*** 6.176** 5.479*** 
  (1.844) (1.717) (1.984) (2.506) (1.965) 
Legal origins: Scandinavian  -1.842 -0.409 -5.986 -5.409 -1.338 
  (1.268) (1.213) (3.737) (4.098) (4.301) 
Latitude   -0.115*** -0.087* -0.076 -0.109*** 
   (0.042) (0.044) (0.047) (0.039) 
Log GDP per capita    -0.307 -0.496 4.272** 
    (1.064) (1.626) (2.090) 
Percent Muslim    -0.028 -0.061 -0.089** 
    (0.039) (0.042) (0.039) 
Percent Catholic     -0.022 -0.008 -0.018 
    (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) 
Percent Protestant    0.069 0.029 0.033 
    (0.058) (0.053) (0.051) 
Ethno Fractionalization    4.517 4.674 2.942 
    (3.567) (3.387) (2.929) 
Economic Freedom     -0.025 0.339** 
     (0.132) (0.160) 
What-Sugar     -8.991* -4.152 
     (5.285) (4.200) 
Human Capital      -2.021*** 
      (0.536) 
Global Innovation      0.010 
      (0.149) 
Corruption Index      -0.210** 
      (0.095) 
Trade Freedom      0.015 
      (0.172) 
Property Rights       -0.077 
      (0.092) 
       
Observations 88 88 88 85 71 70 
R-squared 0.305 0.547 0.602 0.609 0.622 0.725 
Note: All models are estimated with OLS with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. See Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics and sources of all variables. Legal origins “German” is used as a reference group. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Results, Individualism and Income Inequality 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
              
Panel A: 2SLS results Dependent Variable: Income Inequality (Net GINI) 
       
Individualism -0.406*** -0.259*** -0.214*** -0.372*** -0.454** -0.205 
 (0.0608) (0.0494) (0.0529) (0.123) (0.245) (0.256) 
Legal origins: Socialist  0.00807 0.653 2.236 4.212 4.087 
  (3.341) (3.120) (3.701) (4.740) (5.672) 
Legal origins: French  7.514** 5.805* 10.79** 12.02** 7.450 
  (3.245) (3.049) (4.191) (5.943) (5.691) 
Legal origins: UK  11.55*** 9.013*** 11.83*** 15.81* 10.93 
  (3.184) (3.093) (4.241) (8.091) (8.361) 
Legal origins: Scandinavian  -0.599 0.322 -11.42* -4.992 -3.076 
  (4.176) (3.880) (6.681) (7.332) (6.143) 
Latitude   -0.0889** -0.0185 -0.000926 -0.0830 
   (0.0358) (0.0554) (0.0722) (0.0510) 
Log GDP per capita    1.801 2.865 5.098*** 
    (1.386) (2.645) (1.726) 
Percent Muslim    -0.0230 -0.0721 -0.0888*** 
    (0.0392) (0.0477) (0.0337) 
Percent Catholic     -0.0180 -0.0241 -0.0225 
    (0.0310) (0.0359) (0.0249) 
Percent Protestant    0.183** 0.114 0.0769 
    (0.0852) (0.0976) (0.0898) 
Ethno Fractionalization    2.793 4.018 3.633 
    (4.339) (4.939) (3.334) 
Economic Freedom     0.154 0.213 
     (0.190) (0.264) 
What-Sugar     0.339 -1.207 
     (9.871) (6.338) 
Human Capital      -2.103*** 
      (0.493) 
Global Innovation      0.0692 
      (0.191) 
Corruption Index      -0.117 
      (0.151) 
Trade Freedom      0.0563 
      (0.185) 
Property Rights       -0.0328 
      (0.115) 
Observations 86 86 86 83 69 68 
R-squared 0.138 0.542 0.605 0.524 0.446 0.750 
IV F-stat 78.37 66.80 51.99 12.08 3.690 1.886 
              
Panel B: First stage Dependent Variable: Individualism Index 
       
Pathogens -23.68*** -25.46*** -23.41*** -16.68*** -10.21* -7.071 
 (2.675) (3.115) (3.247) (4.800) (5.314) (5.149) 
Legal origins: Socialist  -6.920 -7.531 -0.705 6.466 16.73* 
  (8.216) (8.089) (8.675) (8.694) (9.147) 
Legal origins: French  -0.879 2.291 13.31 16.77* 19.15** 
  (8.008) (8.050) (9.278) (9.237) (9.168) 
Legal origins: UK  7.540 11.53 17.98** 26.93*** 30.47*** 
  (8.084) (8.221) (8.541) (8.641) (8.175) 
Legal origins: Scandinavian  4.634 2.589 -18.88 -2.333 -12.42 
  (10.25) (10.14) (14.01) (15.64) (14.98) 
Latitude   0.161* 0.222** 0.191* 0.114 
   (0.0843) (0.0962) (0.0968) (0.101) 
Log GDP per capita    2.573 5.955 0.914 
    (2.765) (3.632) (4.812) 
Percent Muslim    -0.0449 -0.0763 -0.0243 
    (0.0927) (0.100) (0.0983) 
Percent Catholic     -0.0438 -0.0671 -0.0310 
    (0.0755) (0.0776) (0.0734) 
Percent Protestant    0.302** 0.202 0.254* 
    (0.147) (0.157) (0.145) 
Ethno Fractionalization    -13.28 -7.239 -4.075 
    (9.561) (10.24) (9.488) 
Economic Freedom     0.403 -0.799* 
     (0.303) (0.452) 
What-Sugar     16.89 9.317 
     (16.45) (15.34) 
Human Capital      -0.706 
      (1.453) 
Global Innovation      0.467 
      (0.463) 
Corruption Index      0.364 
      (0.297) 
Trade Freedom      0.312 
      (0.450) 
Property Rights       0.305 
      (0.233) 
Observations 86 86 86 83 69 68 
R-squared 0.483 0.534 0.555 0.605 0.697 0.778 
Note: Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates with the net Gini coefficient. Panel B reports the corresponding first 
stage. See Table 1 for summary statistics and description of all variables. “Legal Origins: German” is used as a 
reference group. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Robustness, Additional Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
               
Panel A: 2SLS results Dependent variable: income inequality (net Gini)  
        
Individualism -0.233*** -0.270** -0.243*** -0.233*** -0.223*** -0.274*** -0.301** 
 (0.0819) (0.120) (0.0858) (0.0813) (0.0851) (0.0894) (0.119) 
        
Life expectancy -0.359**      -0.540** 
 (0.167)      (0.221) 
Tropics  -2.175     -5.062 
  (3.536)     (4.425) 
Masculinity   0.00668    0.0253 
   (0.0466)    (0.0553) 
Uncertainty    -0.0891**   -0.130** 
    (0.0409)   (0.0552) 
Long term orientation     0.0423  -0.000273 
     (0.0491)  (0.0559) 
Indulgence      -0.00479 -0.00717 
      (0.0440) (0.0495) 
        
Observations 84 83 84 84 73 69 68 
R-squared 0.615 0.571 0.586 0.616 0.579 0.508 0.578 
IV F-stat 21.33 12.93 21.78 21.93 21.68 20.63 12.25 
Durbin pval 0.113 0.111 0.0755 0.126 0.0883 0.0116 0.0384 
        
Panel B: First Stage Dependent variable: Individualism index  
        
Pathogens -19.44*** -14.76*** -19.21*** -19.56*** -20.69*** -21.79*** -16.93*** 
 (4.209) (4.103) (4.117) (4.177) (4.443) (4.799) (4.838) 
        
Observations 84 83 84 84 73 69 68 
R-squared 0.574 0.635 0.591 0.580 0.578 0.580 0.686 
Note: Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates with the net Gini coefficient. Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. See Table 
1 for summary statistics and description of all variables. All models include legal origins, latitude, and logged GDP as 
additional controls. “Legal Origins: German” is used as a reference group. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5: Robustness, Sub-Samples 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Panel A: 2SLS  
               
Individualism -0.249** -0.322*** -0.236* -0.283*** -0.265*** -0.182 -0.249** 
 (0.122) (0.0890) (0.122) (0.0921) (0.0820) (0.133) (0.113) 
Controls       
Continental Dummies  	 	 	 	 	 	
Excluded Whole Sample No Africa No Asia 
No North 
America No South America No Europe 
No Influential 
Observations 
        
Observations 84 69 66 75 77 52 78 
R-squared 0.605 0.577 0.640 0.582 0.559 0.311 0.642 
IV F-stat 11.91 19.27 9.183 19.91 24.29 7.210 17.340 
                
 
Panel B: First Stage 
        
Pathogens -16.09*** -20.06*** -18.35*** -19.21*** -21.87*** -15.84** -15.67*** 
 (4.663) (4.568) (6.056) (4.305) (4.437) (5.900) (5.016) 
        
Controls       
Continental Dummies  	 	 	 	 	 	
Excluded Whole Sample No Africa No Asia 
No North 
America No South America No Europe 
No Influential 
Observations 
        
Observations 84 69 66 75 77 52 78 
R-squared 0.671 0.624 0.638 0.564 0.584 0.388 0.580 
Note: Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates with the net Gini coefficient. Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. See Table 1 for summary 
statistics and description of all variables. “Legal Origins: German” is used as a reference group. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
All models include legal origins, latitude, and logged GDP, religion, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization as additional controls. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Influential Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Alternative Inequality Measures 
  Gini (Net) UTIP (Gross) 90/10 80/20 
 
Panel A: 2SLS 
 
Individualism -0.359*** -0.522** -0.213** -0.129* 
 (0.126) (0.227) (0.0910) (0.0701) 
Controls     
     
Observations 83 81 81 81 
R-squared 0.542 0.471 0.464 0.697 
IV F-stat 21.13 20.59 20.18 20.59 
 
Panel B: First Stage 
 
Pathogens -16.20*** -16.36*** -16.36*** -15.96*** 
 (4.878) (4.932) (4.932) (5.183) 
Controls     
     
Observations 83 81 81 81 
R-squared 0.607 0.606 0.606 0.582 
Note: Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates with the net Gini coefficient. Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. See Table 1 for 
summary statistics and description of all variables. “Legal Origins: German” is used as a reference group. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. All models include legal origins, latitude, logged GDP, religion, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and economic 
freedom as additional controls. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Alternative Measures of Individualism 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
 Dependent Variable: Gini (Net) 
 
Panel A: 2SLS 
 
Individualism 
-0.359***    
 -0.126    
Embeddedness  30.14**   
  (14.10)   
Affective Autonomy   -14.07**  
   (6.488)  
Intellectual Autonomy    -31.96** 
    (15.09) 
Controls     
     
Observations 83 71 71 71 
R-squared 0.542 0.447 0.463 0.437 
IV F-stat 21.13 8.289 11.66 5.507 
   
Panel B: First Stage 
Pathogens -16.20*** 0.163*** -0.349*** -0.153** 
 (4.878) (0.0565) (0.102) (0.0654) 
     
Controls     
     
Observations 83 71 71 71 
R-squared 0.607 0.817 0.665 0.745 
Note: Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates with the net Gini coefficient. Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. See Table 1 for 
summary statistics and description of all variables. “Legal Origins: German” is used as a reference group. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. All models include legal origins, latitude, logged GDP, religion, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and economic 
freedom as additional controls. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Two-Stage Least Squares Results, Individualism and Alternative Outcomes 
 
  Gini (Net) 
Power 
Distance 
Property 
Rights Corruption 
Trade 
Freedom 
Human 
Capital 
Global Innovation 
Index 
                
Panel A: 2SLS 
 
Individualism -0.243*** -0.810*** 0.698*** -0.559*** 0.227** 0.0704*** 0.136* 
 (0.0855) (0.206) (0.202) (0.156) (0.103) (0.0199) (0.0758) 
Controls        
        
Observations 84 93 92 93 92 87 89 
R-squared 0.586 0.491 0.670 0.670 0.418 0.712 0.767 
IV F-stat 21.13 20.59 20.18 20.59 20.18 21.60 21.26 
                
        
Panel B: First Stage  
Pathogens -19.27*** -19.10*** -19.13*** -19.10*** -19.13*** -20.12*** -19.84*** 
 (4.192) (4.210) (4.258) (4.210) (4.258) (4.329) (4.304) 
Controls        
        
Observations 84 93 92 93 92 87 89 
R-squared 0.570 0.507 0.506 0.507 0.506 0.525 0.515 
Note: Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates with the net Gini coefficient. Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. See Table 1 for summary statistics and 
description of all variables. “Legal Origins: German” is used as a reference group. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
All models include legal origins, latitude, and logged GDP, religion, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization as additional controls. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Appendix 
 
Table A1: Key differences between individualistic and collectivistic societies  
 
Collectivist Individualist 
 
General norms, family, school, and workplace 
 
People are born into extended families or other in-groups 
which continue to protect them in exchange for loyalty 
Everyone grows up to look after him/ herself and his/her 
immediate (nuclear) family only 
Identity is based in the social network to which one 
belongs 
Identity is based in the individual 
Children learn to think in terms of 'we' Children learn to think in terms of 'I' 
Harmony should always be maintained and direct 
confrontations avoided 
Speaking one's mind is a characteristic of an honest 
person 
High-context communication Low-context communication 
Trespassing leads to shame and loss of face for self and 
group 
Trespassing leads to guilt and loss of self-respect 
Purpose of education is learning how to do Purpose of education is learning how to learn 
Diplomas provide entry to higher status groups Diplomas increase economic worth and/or self-respect 
Relationship employer-employee is perceived in moral 
terms, like a family link 
Relationship employer-employee is a contract supposed to 
be based on mutual advantage 
Hiring and promotion decisions take employees' in-group 
into account 
Hiring and promotion decisions are supposed to be based 
on skills and rules only 
Management is management of groups Management is management of individuals 
Relationship prevails over task Task prevails over relationship 
 
Politics and ideas 
 
Collective interests prevail over individual interests Individual interests prevail over collective interests 
Private life is invaded by group(s) Everyone has a right to privacy 
Opinions are predetermined by group membership Everyone is expected to have a private opinion 
Laws and rights differ by group Laws and rights are supposed to be the same for all 
Dominant role of the state in the economic system Restrained role of the state in the economic system 
Economy based on collective interests  Economy based on individual interests  
Political power exercised by interest groups Political power exercised by voters 
Press controlled by the state Press freedom 
Imported economic theories largely irrelevant because 
unable to deal with collective and particular interests 
Native economic theories based on pursuit of individual 
self-interests 
Ideologies of equality prevail over ideologies of individual 
freedom 
Ideologies of individual freedom prevail over ideologies of 
equality 
Harmony and consensus in society are ultimate goals Self-actualization by every individual is an ultimate goal 
Source: Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. New York: McGraw Hill. 
 
